Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the earth. Historically, it was seen as a tightly coveted state capability, especially during the cold war.

However, the emergence of private companies such as, Maxar Technologies, Planet Labs, Airbus Defense, etc, with satellite constellations of their own have had an accelerated democratization effect, leading to a rise in private geospatial intelligence culture.

The need for privatized GEOINT does not stem from a lack of capability on the government’s end, rather it stems from the application link. The first aspect of such is – classification. By design, the satellite imagery and data under national reconnaissance satellites is classified, thus cannot be shared freely without guard rails even with allies. Furthermore, the sharing of such intelligence amidst active war with a country in need also carries the risk of aligning a country with a specific side in a war it is geographically and politically distanced from.

Commercial imagery moves freely. If appropriately licensed it can also be shared between a country and its allies with very few guard rails. This solves the issue of information relay delay. This can be taken solely as an operational advantage with very little political machinations, and aids in avoiding diplomatic sensitivities that conventionally accompany such an act as national intelligence sharing.

The international system offers countries with the highest threshold of plausible deniability more leeway in the consequences of their actions. When a government either out of ability or otherwise cannot be seen conducting ISR yet needs actionable intelligence, sees private GEOINT providers as the natural solution. Purchase of an image or otherwise from private vendors creates a vacuum of attribution towards an entity. The information is real, but who to blame? This enables countries to hedge around bi-lateral agreements, multilateral treaties, and helps them avoid the danger of triggering any regulatory protocols.

Furthermore, for countries that cannot afford to sustain a constellation of satellites, a subscription to Maxar Technologies, or Airbus Defense, allows them a threshold of participation on the same level as major powers who are currently active in space at a fraction of the cost.

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The case of Russia-Ukraine since 2022, has to be the biggest instance of private GEOINT actively helping a war effort for a country that does not have a sovereign constellation network. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) of the U.S. acted as conduit for commercial GEOINT pipeline for Kyiv, getting 40 million square kilometers of commercial data to the Ukrainians in the first two weeks of the war alone. The effect was immediate and tangible.

One of the first critical moments came shortly after Russia’s February 24 invasion, when Maxar’s imagery tracked the infamous 40-mile Russian armored convoy as it bore down on Kyiv, exposing Russia’s operational intent.  Ukraine accessed synthetic aperture radar and electro-optical imagery from Maxar, Planet Labs, ICEYE, etc. SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) systems provided nighttime and all-weather capabilities, while Planet’s CubeSats updated geospatial coverage daily.

This multi-source, commercially available intelligence allowed Ukraine to track Russian troop movements, conduct battle damage assessments, and share intelligence with allies without the friction of classified information protocols. Crucially, the private yet commercial nature of such information meant that Ukraine was able to share it with NATO countries without hesitation, allowing them a level of readiness preparations too. Private GEOINT, in short, helped a smaller nation sustain situational awareness against a military that dwarfed it.

The current three-way war between U.S, Iran, and Israel has also been instructive in identifying the streamlines of GEOINT sharing. Private satellite data has been embedded at every level in the offensives by US-Israel following the beginning of Operation Epic Fury. The identification of Iran’s enrichment centers – courtesy of Planet Labs and Vantor, has allowed the two to carry out bombing without hesitation on Iranian soil.

Conversely, it has been alleged by the Americans that Iran is being aided by MizarVision (another private firm). It has aided the IRGC in refining the targeting of U.S bases and radars in the middle east, further allowing for the identifications of THAAD launchers, and even transportation corridors. It allows Iran the opportunity to carry asymmetric warfare tactics with relative ease while refusing to implicate third party involvements in the war.

The participation of private firms in competing over intelligence is still on an accelerated trajectory upwards, there are no firm regulatory frameworks in place to provide safeguards, it is more of a dual-use (commercial/military) issue rather than a governance issue.

For instance, on the urging of the U.S government, Planet Labs and Vantor restricted access to satellite imagery of the middle east during the current war, however that does not stop other firms from advertising either through open-source or other means and carries the risk of tipping the scales heavily in favor of the opposing side.

Ultimately, private geospatial intelligence is not a stop-gap for states that do not have a sovereign constellation network, but rather a structurally distinct hedging capability. It can bypass the issues surrounding coalition information sharing, the problems of political legitimacy, operational lag, and helps smaller states overcome hurdles that they cannot invest in solving indigenously. It is now normal for a country to rely on a web of private actors for preemptive preparations, all the way to the end of operations.

Subjectively, the next decade holds a conundrum for great powers interacting with middle powers, since middle powers can now garner the ability to deny visuals on themselves, or gain visuals on great power movements. The obscurus that is the threshold of success has risen greatly in favor of asymmetric dynamics rather than traditional IR and Security Studies thinking.

Since international law is yet to catch up in this regard, the strategic boon for developing states lies in building a web of interactions with private entities to compliment domestic capability for actionable intelligence, and operational readiness.

Anas Yamin

Anas Yamin is a student of International Relations, active in Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, and Arms Control.

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