Russia Deploys 24 New Combat Aircraft in 2025
Russia deploys two dozen new combat aircraft in 2025, with Ukrainian sources confirming delivery of approximately 14 Su-34 frontline bombers and 10 Su-35S fighter jets to Russian armed forces. As Russia deploys two dozen new combat aircraft in 2025, these additions expand Moscow’s tactical aviation inventory entering the war’s fourth year, enabling increased pressure on Ukraine through intensified guided weapon employment and strengthened air cover for frontline operations.
Su-34 Strike Aircraft Expansion
The Su-34 frontline bomber, manufactured by Sukhoi Design Bureau and operated by Russian Aerospace Forces, serves as a twin-engine strike platform launching glide bombs and precision munitions from standoff distances. The delivery of 14 additional Su-34s significantly enhances Russia’s ability to conduct sustained bombardment campaigns against Ukrainian positions while remaining beyond effective Ukrainian air defense engagement ranges.
Su-35S Air Superiority Reinforcement
The Su-35S represents Russia’s most modern serially produced air superiority fighter currently in active production. The addition of approximately 10 Su-35S aircraft strengthens Russian air cover for frontline operations, providing advanced multirole capabilities combining air-to-air dominance with secondary ground attack functions. These fighters protect strike packages and maintain air superiority over contested airspace.
Standoff Strike Capability Enhancement
These aircraft additions support more frequent Russian strikes launched from inside Russian airspace, where Ukrainian forces remain restricted from employing partner-supplied missiles against Russian airbases. This asymmetric constraint prevents Ukraine from targeting aircraft on the ground before they launch strikes, allowing Moscow to sustain aviation assets closer to frontlines without risking airfield attacks.
Shift in Loss Patterns
Ukrainian sources indicate a significant shift in Russian aviation losses during 2025 compared to earlier war phases. While Russian combat aircraft were primarily lost to Ukrainian air defenses or destroyed during airfield attacks in 2022-2023, losses in 2025 predominantly result from non-combat causes including mechanical failures and pilot error rather than enemy action.
Previous Combat Loss Assessments
Open-source monitoring organization Oryx previously documented Ukrainian destruction of at least 41 Su-34 and 8 Su-35S aircraft since the February 2022 full-scale invasion began. Most documented losses occurred during the war’s early phases when Russian aircraft operated more aggressively within Ukrainian air defense engagement zones and Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes against Russian airbases.
Reduced Combat Exposure
Analysts attribute the changed loss pattern to two intersecting factors: Russia’s growing reliance on long-range guided aviation weapons reducing exposure to Ukrainian air defenses, and external restrictions on Ukraine’s use of partner-supplied missiles against Russian bases. These conditions allow Russia to preserve more aircraft from direct Ukrainian fire while revealing internal readiness problems within Russian aviation units.
Defense Industrial Capacity Demonstration
Russia’s ability to field new Su-34 and Su-35S aircraft at this scale suggests its defense industry maintains capacity to replace losses despite comprehensive Western sanctions. However, analysts note these aircraft often incorporate simplified or downgraded subsystems due to sanctions preventing access to Western-origin components and advanced electronics previously integrated into Russian military aviation.
Sanctions Impact on Capabilities
While Russia continues producing aircraft numerically, sanctions have forced substitution of domestic components for previously imported Western electronics, navigation systems, and avionics. This substitution potentially reduces individual aircraft capabilities compared to pre-war production standards, though specific performance degradation remains difficult to assess from open sources.
Expanded Strike Volume Potential
Additional aircraft expand Russia’s potential strike volume and air-cover capability, particularly along operational axes where glide bombs have played decisive battlefield roles. The 2025 deliveries enable Russia to intensify guided aircraft munitions employment against Ukrainian troop concentrations, logistics hubs, and fortified positions across multiple sectors simultaneously.
Glide Bomb Campaign Intensification
Ukrainian units along several sectors report continued bombardment by glide bombs launched from Su-34s operating beyond Ukrainian air defense system ranges. These standoff weapons, typically FAB-500 and FAB-1500 variants fitted with UMPK (Unified Gliding and Correction Module) guidance kits, enable Russian forces to strike Ukrainian positions with substantial explosive payloads while minimizing aircraft exposure.
Ukrainian Air Defense Limitations
Ukraine’s air defense systems, while effective against aircraft penetrating their engagement zones, cannot effectively counter standoff glide bomb attacks launched from Russian airspace. This operational reality creates asymmetric advantage for Russian aviation, enabling sustained bombardment campaigns without proportionate aircraft losses that would normally constrain such intensive operations.
Partner-Supplied Missile Restrictions
Western restrictions on Ukrainian employment of partner-supplied long-range missiles against targets inside Russia prevent effective counter-air operations targeting Russian airbases hosting strike aircraft. These political constraints, intended to prevent escalation, effectively create sanctuary zones where Russian aviation can operate with reduced risk compared to unrestricted conflict scenarios.
Operational Tempo Sustainability
The new aircraft deliveries enable sustained high operational tempo that would otherwise prove difficult as existing airframes accumulate flight hours and require increasingly intensive maintenance. Fresh aircraft allow rotating strike packages while older platforms undergo necessary servicing, maintaining consistent pressure on Ukrainian forces without operational pauses.
Production Rate Implications
Delivering approximately 24 combat aircraft annually demonstrates Russia maintains meaningful military aviation production capacity despite sanctions and economic constraints. While this production rate falls substantially below Soviet-era output when Russian aviation industry supplied aircraft to dozens of nations globally, it suffices for replacing combat losses and modestly expanding tactical aviation strength.
Comparative Production Context
For context, China produces substantially more combat aircraft annually, while Western production focuses on more sophisticated but lower-volume platforms like F-35 variants. Russia’s continued Su-34 and Su-35S production, even at reduced technological sophistication due to sanctions, provides quantitative capacity offsetting qualitative limitations compared to most advanced Western systems.
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Strategic Implications
Russia’s ability to sustain combat aircraft production and field replacement platforms entering the war’s fourth year demonstrates resilience contradicting some earlier Western assessments predicting rapid Russian defense industrial exhaustion. This production capacity, combined with operational adaptations reducing aircraft exposure, suggests Russia can maintain aviation-intensive operations indefinitely absent major policy changes.
Future Delivery Prospects
If Russia maintains similar production rates, 2026 could see comparable or increased deliveries as defense industry optimization continues and sanctions workarounds mature. However, sustainability questions remain regarding access to critical components, skilled workforce availability, and whether current production rates can continue if the conflict extends beyond 2026.
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